SHIPPING CHOKEPOINTS OF
THE ARABIAN PENINSULA
by Ghassan Abdallah, Ph.D.
January 13, 2010

The Arabian subcontinent located in Southwest Asia is, evidently, geopolitically very critical due to its vast oil and natural gas reserves.  Three easily blocked straits, commonly known as "chokepoints," may hamper ships from entering or exiting this area or the Red Sea and Persian Gulf. These three narrow chokepoints are the Strait of Hormuz, Bab el Mandeb Strait, and the Gulf of Suez or the Suez Canal. 

Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates, all use the Persian Gulf as the primary sea route for most, if not all, of their oil exports.  In the past, attempts have been made to reroute, at least part of the flow of oil, away from the Persian Gulf.   For example, in the late 1940's, the Arab American Oil Company (Aramco) which, at the time, was owned by the big four American companies-- Standard Oil of New Jersey (Exxon), Standard Oil Company of California (Chevron), Texas Oil Company (Texaco), and Socony-Vacuum (Mobil), attempted to create a shortcut for the fleet of tankers hauling oil from Saudi Arabia by building a pipeline from Qaisuma in Northeast Saudi Arabia to the Lebanese town of Sidon.  The 750-mile Trans-Arabian Pipeline or Tapline, completed in 1950, would save tankers the 3500-mile, ten day journey around the Arabian Peninsula, through the Strait of Hormuz, Bab el Mandeb Strait at the Gulf of Aden, and the Suez Canal, and instead, allow, a for much faster and cheaper supply of oil to the North Atlantic nations from large storage tanks on the Mediterranean coast of Lebanon.  However, the pipeline which had a maximum capacity of 500,000 barrels per day (bpd), was permanently shut down in 1976 due to two main reasons. First, unstable or at times strained relations between the Saudis and the Syrians and Jordanians, whose territories the pipeline went through.  And second, the start of civil war in Lebanon-- a country with a history of sectarian strife, weak governments, and political instability.  

In 1980 Saudi Arabia acquired a 100% interest in Aramco and the company was renamed Saudi Aramco.  In 1981 Aramco constructed the East-West Petroline, commonly known as the Dhahran-Yanbu Pipeline, which allows for the safe movement of petroleum from the oil fields in the eastern parts of the kingdom to the Red Sea. Unlike the Trans-Arabian Pipeline, the Yanbu Pipeline, which was expanded in 1987, boosting capacity to 3.2 million barrels (bpd), was not vulnerable to blockage from third-party nations since it passed through Saudi territory only.  The Saudis understood the dangers of the neighborhood and Yanbu reduced the hazards of land and, more importantly, sea blockage in the Persian Gulf, specifically at the Strait of Hormuz. Of the three chokepoints surrounding the Arabian Peninsula, the narrow and often hostile Strait of Hormuz presents the greatest risk for blockage.  That is why it made perfect sense to create an outlet for shipping oil at the other, western, side of the peninsula on the Red Sea.  Shipping from the Red Sea to the Mediterranean can be theoretically hampered at Suez.  However, that is highly unlikely since Egypt is considered a friendly country.  If shipping disruptions occur they are more likely to occur at the southern end of the Red Sea at Bab el Mandeb Strait or the Gulf of Aden, separating the Red Sea from the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean. 

While worries regarding shipping disruptions at the Strait of Hormuz are not new and date back to the Iran-Iraq war when Kuwaiti ships were reflagged and escorted by U.S. Navy vessels, worries over shipping disruptions at the Bab el Mandeb Strait became a concern only recently. The Gulf of Aden has become a center of Somali pirate activity.  Piracy not only threatens oil shipments but practically all trade between Europe and Asia.  The provincial government in Somalia is extremely weak, does not control vast areas of its territory, and is battling an Islamist militant organization, known as Al-Shabab.   Things are not much better across the gulf in Yemen, where the Yemeni government does not control any territory outside the capital of Sana'a.  The Yemeni government is being challenged by separatists in both the southern and northern parts of the country, as well as Islamist militants affiliated with Al-Qaida.

When one looks at that part of the world it is not a bright picture.  The problems that may occur are numerous-- Inter Arab rivalries, Arab-Israeli conflicts, Arab-Iranian disputes, potential Iranian-Israeli hostilities, piracy, lawlessness, and terrorism. The Arab, conservative oil producing, countries of the gulf, as well as Iraq all depend on American military power for their protection if not their outright survival. Similarly, the responsibility of protecting shipping lanes in the area falls, entirely, on the United States Navy. The heavy American military presence in the neighborhood is not for show. The United States Central Command or USCENTCOM's forward base is located in Doha, Qatar in the heart of the Persian Gulf.  The United States also maintains bases in Bahrain, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, and Iraq.  The U.S. Navy's 5th fleet patrols the Persian Gulf, the Arabian Sea, and Red Sea and the 6th fleet patrols the Mediterranean Sea.  There is enough American air and naval firepower in the area to obliterate any party, whether it is a state or a non-state actor, which attempts to block shipping through any of the straits.  The region's troubles notwithstanding, shipping cannot be disrupted, nor can the straits be blocked, for any significant amount of time, unless there is a failure in American political leadership-- meaning American military power is not properly applied or underused in the form of a soft response. 

© 2010  Ghassan Abdallah, PhD
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Ghassan Abdallah, Ph.D | Adjunct Professor, Univ. of Houston | Email