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THE LONG VIEW
by Bud Conrad
Editor, Conrad's
Charts for CaseyResearch.com
November 22, 2006
We
at Casey Research like to take the long-term view. As part of our
ongoing research to understand current investment options and stay
abreast of long-term economic trends, we look at how the economy fared
under the previous stressful times of the Great Depression. Are there
any important similarities?
There
are a number of important sub-models of this investigation, but only one
of them is featured here. Identifying a number of the significant
economic drivers of then and now, we will expand on others in an
upcoming International
Speculator issue.
It
is critical to get the real data for this kind of analysis because even
after seven decades, there are very differing interpretations of the
causes of the depression. Many who worry about the parallels and see
economic difficulty ahead are looking for similarities, like the
expansion of debt and the unusual rise in stocks. This piece examines
one of the most important imbalances of our time, an item that is
decidedly different from the 1920s: the Trade Deficit.
How
Serious is the Trade Deficit?
Last
weeks report from our Treasury on foreign investment in the U.S brings me to focus on the trade balance, related foreign investment, our
loss of manufacturing, and the long-term implications.
I
have been monitoring the big imbalances of our economic system to
determine if we are heading toward a big economic convulsion that would
change our investments and our lives. I have been evaluating long-term
historical measures of prosperity and economic movement, comparing the
last big depression to now to see if we face similar situations. Some of
the similarities look dangerous, like the large overall indebtedness of
then and now. Some of the differences do not show so serious a situation
today, such as the relatively stronger financial institutions that would
surely get government bail-out if liquidity became a problem. But there
is one difference that is much worse now: the trade deficit.
First,
here is the trade balance as usually reported, showing a big drop
starting in the 1970s, as we began to buy more than we sold abroad:

Accumulating
the annual numbers above shows the position of how much the U.S. owes or is owed by the world:

The
question is what that means for our financial system. Decades ago, the U.S.
was smaller and dollars were worth more, so we need a baseline to make
the periods comparable. The method I use is to calculate the ratio of
trade deficit (or surplus) to GDP. The positive position we enjoyed in
the lead-up to the 1929 crash has eroded now to a negative position.

The
trade position of the U.S. was very strong before and during the great depression. The dollar was
devalued against gold one time by Roosevelt, but was generally strong. In fact, we experienced deflation, meaning
the purchasing power of the dollar increased, as prices of homes and
other items crashed. The foreign situation of accumulated international
debt is exactly the opposite of what it was in the 1920s. This important
difference shows why the dollar then turned out to be strong, even in
the face of disastrous economic contraction that brought 25%
unemployment. Now, the accumulated trade deficit hangs over the dollar
so that this time looking forward, the opposite conclusion is more
likely: the dollar will succumb to decreasing purchasing power. Many
commentators suggest that if we are headed toward recession or, even
worse, to depression, that will be deflationary just like it was in the
1930s. I believe we are headed toward serious financial times, but I do
not see the deflation of that time returning. Foreigners lending us
$2.5B per day can’t continue forever. When it fails, we will not see
deflation but big inflation. Foreigners all wanting to get out of dollar
positions will drive the dollar down and prices up as they bid for
assets other than dollars.
We
can look at today’s numbers from the Treasury on foreign investment to
see the size of foreign support by their reinvestment of their trade
surplus in our Treasuries, agencies, stocks and bonds. I monitor the
reinvestment as an indicator of pressure on the dollar. The data from
today, averaged over the last 3 months, does not show a problem.
Foreigners are still investing in U.S.
financial assets, despite pronouncements from the Chinese and other
central banks that they want to divest some of their U.S. holdings. In aggregate they are continuing to invest. The reinvestment
by foreigners is equal to the trade deficit, so imbalances have
escalated together as shown in the chart below:

The
underlying data from today show this source of reinvestment may be more
precarious than the surface shows. China is the country we watch most closely because they hold the biggest hoard
of foreign currencies of $1 trillion. China still added to their U.S. dollar denominated holdings, even if at a
slower rate this month. The other two biggest purchasers are London
and Grand Cayman Islands. They are different because they are money centers, and are passing
through investments from other countries from such sources as hedge
funds and countries that prefer anonymity, like oil countries. The
surprise is the amazing size of the investment from London:

Investing
money centers are potentially able to change their position on a whim,
as seen in London ’s negative move in July. London’s investment of $47B is huge compared to the worldwide net foreign
purchase of $88B. This trade deficit and investment juggling act has
succeeded, and on the surface has held together. When you look at the
components, the underpinnings do not look so stable.
The
other side of the trade deficit is that foreign cheap labor has replaced
manufacturing in the U.S., hollowing out our lower and middle class incomes. The chart below
shows U.S. manufacturing jobs as % of total jobs. The expanding trade deficit
matches the decreasing U.S. manufacturing jobs. This is exactly as expected, but it is not good for
the long-term economic strength of the U.S.

The
destruction of productive capacity will decrease our long-term wealth
creation. With U.S. production decline, there is less need for investment in that productive
capacity. Investment, which is the basis for future growth, has moved to
Asia. U.S. corporations seeking to increase profits by cutting costs actively
supported these moves. That means less wealth for the U.S. because we are not producing as much. The economy will weaken because we
are not paying our workers to make the things we import, so they will
have less to spend. Foreigners have put off the problem in the short
term by lending us the money to buy their exports and maintain our
lifestyle. But this can only continue until foreigners fear that they
may lose by holding too many dollar investments that start to decrease
in purchasing value.
So
in conclusion, the trade deficit is very serious, especially in the long
term. It is part of the hollowing out of American production and wealth
creation. As a consequence of borrowing to buy those foreign goods, we
have sold off some of our future profits as we have to pay interest on
Treasuries and dividends on stock holdings, with the result that the
dollar will weaken. Foreigners have continued with the deadly embrace of
extending more credit to us, so we appear wealthier than we are. But
should they try to extricate themselves from their dollar holdings, the
consequence will be a devaluing dollar. Even if we head toward a massive
economic slowdown 1929-style, a serious deflation is unlikely because of
the negative position of our trade deficit. A weakening dollar will be
supportive to gold and precious metals in the long term.
Bud
Conrad
AUTHOR
BIO:
In
future editions of the International
Speculator, we will comment on other important economic movers such
as the stock market, debt, housing and gold--comparing how they
interacted then and now with the unfolding economic scenario.
Bud
Conrad holds a Bachelor of Engineering degree from Yale University
and an MBA from Harvard. Among others, he has held positions with IBM,
CDC and Amdahl. Currently he serves as a local board member of the
National Association of Business Economics and teaches graduate courses
in investing at Golden Gate University.
His
data and analysis regularly appears in the pages of Doug Casey
's International
Speculator, which is dedicated to uncovering gold and silver
stocks with 100% or better profit potential...

© 2006 Bud Conrad
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