A
reader recently directed me to a web site that features the commentary
of the distinguished Dr. John Hussman, who runs the Hussman series of
mutual funds. Hussman publishes a weekly commentary on various
market-related issues on his web site. In a recent commentary
published on the Hussman Funds web site (www.hussmanfunds.com)
he asked the question, “How Much Do Interest Rates Affect the Fair
Value of Stocks?” He writes:
“If you
watch CNBC for a few minutes, you'll immediately hear some analyst claim
that stocks are cheap because the ‘forward earnings yield’ on the
S&P 500 is higher than the 10-year Treasury yield. The next analyst
will just say that “stocks look cheap compared with bonds.” The next
will offer some strange convolution of the so-called ‘Fed Model,’
like ‘Sure, P/E multiples are above average, but bonds are trading at
a P/E of 21.’ After a short break from the monotony by some kind of
circus clown playing with horns and buzzers, another analyst then comes
on saying how the firm's ‘valuation model’ (which is driven by
forward operating earnings and interest rates) implies that stocks are
20% undervalued.”
After reading
the above paragraph, my first impression is that Dr. Hussman is speaking
“sour grapes.” Dr. Hussman is an exceptionally brilliant mind
and is a former economics professor at the University of Michigan and
has been actively in financial markets since 1981 (according to his web
site). His experience and credentials cannot be disputed. The
performance of his company’s Strategic Growth Fund (HSGFX) was strong
from its inception in 2001 until the end of 2003. This is quite
impressive given the background of the financial markets at that time,
viz., a major bear market from 2001-2002. Since peaking in early 2004,
however, the HSGFX has underperformed the S&P 500 and has gone
mostly sideways for the past 3 ½ years. When one has “missed
the party” for so long, it’s easy to see how one could develop a
negative attitude concerning the bulls who have ridden the market rally
since 2004.
Not that Dr.
Hussman’s attitude is negative concerning the bulls, per se. His gripe
seems to be focused on the bulls’ reliance of various stock market
valuation models that compare the S&P earnings yield with bond
yields. Here is where many leading bulls take issue with Dr.
Hussman. If Hussman is correct, then one of the central rationales
behind this bull market, from a fundamental standpoint, is nothing but
hot air and the market is destined to disappoint a lot of bulls. But if
the bulls are correct, then it *does* matter that earnings yields are
significantly higher than bond yields, both now and in the foreseeable
future. Which side is correct?
In his latest
piece, Dr. Hussman devotes many paragraphs in defense of his proposition
that “There is, in fact, no stable relationship between earnings
yields and interest rates.” At one point he even launches into a
complex mathematical formula to try and prove that the “true” model
of earnings yields “overestimate(s) the importance of interest rates
in determining stock yields.” His reliance on numbers to prove
his point is evidently aimed at impressing the reader with the vitality
of his analysis and correctness of his conclusions. Yet despite all the
numbers leaping from the page I still couldn’t get out of my head the
saying that “a picture is worth a thousand words…and will trump
mathematics any day!”
The image I
kept seeing was of the IBES Valuation Model and its obvious predictive
value since 1979. It predicted the 1980s bull market. It predicted the
1987 stock market crash. It predicted at least one year in advance the
bear market of 2000-2002. And it announced an end to that bear market in
2002 and has remained in an exceptionally bullish posture ever since.

Dr.
Hussman, however, doesn’t quite see it this way. He writes concerning
the relationship between earnings yields and interest rates: “The
relationship is actually negative in data since 1929, is marginally
positive (but statistically insignificant) in data since 1950, and is
only strongly positive in data from 1980 through 2000 as a statistical
artifact of the disinflationary period from 1980 to 2000.” He
evidently sees the “strongly positive” correlation from 1980 to 2000
as a mere anomaly, a 20-year anomaly at that! I suppose it could
be argued that for an investor taking the long-term view, a mere 20
years is a drop in the bucket and could actually be considered a
short-term anomaly. But fortunes are made and won in the “short
space” of 20 years while a more rational, scientifically-minded
investor is sitting idly on the sidelines waiting for those pesky
correlations between stock and bond yields to normalize.
Dr. Hussman
disparages the use of valuation models that compare stock to bond
yields. Yet in a fund prospectus available on his web site we find
this statement: “The investment manager believes that the
information contained in earnings, balance sheets and annual reports
represents only a fraction of what is known about a given stock.
The price behavior and trading volume of a stock may reveal additional
information about what traders know.”
If Hussman
believes that, then why dismiss the strength this market has been
showing? The broad market has shown persistent strength since the bottom
of last June and since then has shrugged off one negative news item
after another. Could it be that the “smart money” knows something
about the future of the economic and investment climate that most
investors aren’t aware of? Could it be that the persistent rally in
the major averages since last June is foretelling an even bigger boom
ahead? More to the point, could it be that the bull market in
stocks is because money always goes where it is treated best (i.e.,
investors are chasing stocks because the earnings yield is higher than
that of bonds)? I wonder…
One of the
truisms of financial market analysis, or indeed of any endeavor that
involves predicting outcomes, is that a predictive model can and should
always be used as long as it shows consistently positive results.
Even if the rationale behind the forecasting model is flawed, anything
that has consistently predicted outcomes for 20 years or more cannot be
easily dismissed as an anomaly or “just a coincidence.” I’ve heard
highly educated individuals argue until they were blue in the face why,
for instance, a certain stock market timing model “shouldn’t” work
based on all sorts of scientific and mathematical data. Yet the models
these individuals were railing against were beating the market month
after month and year after year. As the old saying goes, “You can’t
argue with success.” The law of averages and probability statistics is
really all you need to know to evaluate the usefulness of a timing
model. The IBES Valuation Model passes muster on all counts.
The
undisputed fact remains that the IBES Valuation Model has been on target
since its first appearance in 1976. It has consistently kept the
disciplined investor who followed its signals on the right side of the
market over the past 20+ years and no amount of economic dissertation
can nullify this fact. As stock market analyst Keith Hays has observed,
“This approach to valuation of the market does not take a rocket
scientist….You can see just how ridiculously overdone the market got
in 2000, and how undervalued it was in early 2003. This gauge has kept
us bullish, and rightfully so, for the last 5 years.” Indeed,
one can’t argue with success, no matter how many mathematical
equations one cares to cite.
Dr. Hussman
dismisses certain of the bullish camp by dismissing them as “some kind
of circus clown.” Yet many of these “clowns” have been having
quite a circus party over the last couple of years. The bearish
ringleaders, meanwhile, have been trying to lead a bears’ parade on
Wall Street but haven’t been able to muster enough interest to turn
things in their favor. The rain is pouring on the bears’ parade
while the circus party rages on. Given the choice between the bears’
vision of the market’s future and that of the bulls, I say send in the
clowns by all means!

© 2007 Clif Droke
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