Financial Sense   Home  l  Broadcast  l  WrapUp  l  Storm Watch  l  About Us  l  Contact Us

The 9-11 Commission Part 3
by Joe Duarte
April 5, 2004
Originally posted on March 29, 2004
at www.joe-duarte.com.

Bush 9/11 Firestorm Continues

Former White House national security staffer Richard Clarke is calling for a declassification of his two year old Congressional testimony about 9-11 as well as: “all e-mails, memos and all other correspondence between him and national security adviser Condoleezza Rice, as well as her private testimony before the commission investigating the Sept. 11 attacks.” According to CBS News.com: “ Republican lawmakers hope to show discrepancies between Richard Clarke's recent attacks on the administration's terrorism policies with flattering statements he made as a White House aide. Rice, a chief critic of Clarke, has said Clarke praised Bush's anti-terror efforts while working for the president, but then began telling a different story after leaving his post and writing a book that has become a best seller since going on sale last week.”

Clarke continued his attack on Bush. According to CBS News.com: “Clarke said President Clinton was more aggressive than President Bush in trying to confront al Qaeda, Osama bin-Laden's organization. [“He did something, and President Bush did nothing prior to September 11,”] said in a broadcast interview. [“I think they deserve a failing grade for what they did before” Sept. 11, Clarke said of the Bush's administration. “They never got around to doing anything.”]

Separately, we note a subtle change in the White House. Karen Hughes, a former Bush aide, who left the White House early to “spend more time” with her family is back. This is a sign that Bush is trying to get his old “mojo” back.

Also interesting is the article, in the highly conservative New York Post that reported an open letter from 9/11 families, that decries Richard Clarke’s book. According to the Post: “A group of New York families of 9/11 victims came out swinging against Richard Clarke yesterday, accusing the former White House anti-terror chief of cashing in on the tragedy with his explosive book. In a scathing open letter, the furious families also ripped Clarke for releasing the controversial tome to coincide with his appearance before the 9/11 commission on Wednesday. ["It was very disturbing to learn that Mr. Clarke would be releasing his book immediately before his scheduled public testimony before the 9/11 commission,"] they said in their emotional ["Open Letter to America."].

The shouting match between Clarke and the White House offers Wall Street a chance to look around and wonder whether it is worth buying stocks, bonds, or anything other than gold at the current time.

We thought we’d explore two issues today. First, what this highly charged atmosphere is doing to the election. And second, what do we really know based on the presumption that the 9/11 commission has actually put together a believable story.

A Review of the Polls

On 3-25 we noted: “ Early indications of public opinion, as in the Wall Street Journal poll, we cited on 3-24, suggest that Clinton may take the brunt of the blame, although, more scientific polls are likely to follow, and that this early indication may change.” It looks as if that change is taking place, and that Richard A. Clarke’s book and public testimony before the 9/11 Commission is damaging the Bush election campaign.

According to the Washington Post: “One Bush aide, who refused to be identified because the administration limits who may speak on the record, acknowledged that the White House had underestimated the political and media firestorm that Clarke would ignite.” The Washington Times, noted that two polls released last week “suggest that a well-publicized book critical of the Bush administration's handling of the war on terror and the hearings looking to assign blame for the intelligence failures before the September 11 attacks have politically damaged President Bush.“

A Fox News/Opinion Dynamics poll released Thursday (3-25-04) “found that 65 percent of respondents were familiar with the charges put forth by former White House counterintelligence expert Richard A. Clarke that Mr. Bush failed to do all he could to prevent the terrorist attacks. Of those who were familiar with Mr. Clarke, 52 percent found the accusations he made in his new book and his testimony Wednesday to the commission to be at least ["somewhat believable."] The poll also put Mr. Bush's favorability rating at 50 percent, the lowest number of his presidency, and a slim majority — 52 percent — said they found the president ["trustworthy,"] also his lowest number.

Furthermore, according to the Times: “the latest Rasmussen Reports Presidential Tracking Poll also shows that the flurry of attention given to Mr. Clarke caused a six-point dip in Mr. Bush's re-election numbers. As of (3-26) the daily tracking poll, based on 500 phone interviews every day, shows Mr. Bush losing re-election to presumed Democratic presidential nominee John Kerry 47 percent to 44 percent. Sunday afternoon, (3-22) before Mr. Clarke's interview promoting his book on CBS's ["60 Minutes,"] Mr. Bush had a 48 to 45 lead over Mr. Kerry. ["It was a dramatic turnaround in a couple of nights, and when something like that happens on one night, I like to see if there is some traction,"] said Scott Rasmussen, who runs the poll. ["And there certainly was."]

By 3-27, our own look at Rasmussen’s daily tracking poll showed that Bush had climbed back to 46% while Kerry had again fallen to 47%, moving back toward the dead heat. By 3-28, the dead heat was on again with both at 45%. A 3-27 Newsweek poll in Washington Post “found that public approval of Bush's handling of terrorism and homeland security had eroded, with his approval rating on those issues dropping to 57 percent from 65 percent just over a month ago. It was 70 percent two months ago. However, 65 percent said Clarke's testimony had not affected their opinion of Bush.”

Most interesting was this from the Newsweek poll: “Bush-Cheney campaign officials expressed relief that the Newsweek poll, taken Thursday and Friday, found that Kerry had failed to capitalize on Bush's woes. Bush's overall approval rating was statistically unchanged, at 49 percent, and he remained in a dead heat with Kerry. The poll, of 1,002 adults, had a margin of error of plus or minus 3 percentage points. The poll showed Bush maintaining a strong showing on the intangible qualities that have always been his biggest appeal. When asked which phrases describe Bush, 62 percent said he has strong leadership qualities, 65 percent said he is personally likable, 61 percent said he says what he believes rather than what people want to hear, and 55 percent said he is honest and ethical. Bush was 6 to 18 percentage points ahead of Kerry in each category.”

The polls are showing that voters supporting Bush are still behind him.

The 9-11 Commission’s Report On Policy Coordination

Below is an interesting timeline, based on our review of the 9/11 Commission’s staff report, on National Policy, released on 3-24-04, and available for public review at www.9-11commission.gov. The statements were contained in a 12 page file, and were edited here for space consideration. The overall message was left intact. We encourage the reader to review this staff report for his/her own benefit.

Background Information

“Counterterrorism issues had not been a high priority during the administration of George H.W. Bush. Terrorist attacks early in the new (Clinton) administration, particularly the 1993 attempt to blow up the World Trade Center, quickly changed this perspective.”

Presidential Decision Directive 39, signed in June 1995, characterized terrorism as both a national security concern as well as a “matter for law enforcement.” Directive 39 had four program areas: reducing vulnerabilities, deterring terrorism, responding to terrorism, and preventing terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction. Responsibilities were assigned to the “departments and agencies of the government.”

The efforts “were to be coordinated by a subordinate NSC (National Security Council) committee called the CSG (Counterterrorism and Security Group). This committee was chaired by an NSC staff member, Richard Clarke. The CSG was the place where domestic security agencies, such as the FBI, regularly met alongside representatives from the traditional national security agencies.”

"President Clinton created a [Small Group]” in which “select principals would meet without aides to discuss “Khobar Towers or Usama bin Laden.” In this group, regular attendants would be National Security Advisor Samuel Berger, CIA Director George Tenet, Secretary of State Marilyn Albright, Defense Secretary William Cohen, Joint Chiefs of Staffs Chairman Hugh Shelton, Deputy National Security Adviser James Steinberg, White House Chief of Staff John Podesta, Richard Clarke, and Vice President Gore’s National Security Adviser, Leon Fuerth. Attorney General Janet Reno, and FBI Director Louis Freeh would “sometimes” participate.

According to the commission's report, “National Security Adviser Berger told us that he designed the Small Group process to keep the highly sensitive information closely-held. There were few paper records.” The report then describes a situation in which, due to the “closely-held” model, “other senior officials in agencies around the government sometimes had little knowledge about what was being decided in the group, other than what they could obtain from the principals or Clarke. This sometimes led to misunderstandings and friction.”

In 1998, the Clinton administration prepared a new presidential directive on counterterrorism, which was meant to reinforce and strengthen “the importance President Clinton attached to unconventional threats at home and abroad and strengthen interagency coordination. The draft directive wold strengthen Clarke’s role by creating the position of a national coordinator for counterterrorism who would be a full member of the Principals Committee or Deputies Committee for meetings on this topic.”

Presidential Directive 62, provided that the director (Clarke) would not direct operations, that the CSG would report to the Deputies Committee, and that the new structure would not change the established budget process.”

The Committee report then noted: “Clarke was a controversial figure. A career civil servant, he drew wide praise as someone who called early and consistent attention to the seriousness of the terrorism danger. A skilled operator of the levers of government, he energetically worked the system to address vulnerabilities and combat terrorists.” The report notes that colleagues had described “his working style as abrasive,” and noted that “some officials told us that Clarke had sometimes misled them about presidential decisions or interfered in their chain of command. National Security Adviser Berger told us that several of his colleagues had wanted Clarke fired.” According to the report, though, Berger thought that Clarke “fulfilled an important role in pushing the interagency process to fight Bin Ladin,” and that he wanted “a pile driver” in the position.

The Clinton Years

Clinton was “concerned about terrorists” obtaining WMD. The key event, according to commission’s quoting of Berger was the 1998 East Africa Embassy bombings. This was described as a “watershed,” which led to a more prominent role for Bin Laden, replacing the previous primary foe, “Iranian-sponsored groups such as Hizbollah.”

Clarke “turned his attention to a government wide strategy for destroying the Bin-Laden threat,” combining political and military activities in a plan dubbed Delenda. “This plan was not formally adopted,” and “Cabinet-level participants in the Small Group have little or no recollection of it, at least as a formal policy document. The principals decided against the rolling military campaign described in the plan. However, Clarke continued to use the other components of the Delenda plan to guide his efforts.”

In 1999, Berger and Clarke told Clinton there was a “virtual certainty” that there would be more attacks on American facilities, and that they were worried about Bin Laden’s “possible acquisition” of weapons of mass destruction, on which they had some recent “fragmentary but disturbing intelligence.” (Editor’s note: recent reports have appeared in the press that indeed Al-Qaeda may already have nuclear brief case bombs.)

The report added that Berger and Clarke told Clinton that the intelligence’s quality was not likely to improve, and that pre-emptive strikes against terrorist camps were discussed but abandoned.

In 1999, the Millennium event threats materialized and the Clinton team were “seized” with this threat, with the CSG “meeting constantly.” During this period, the report describes the relationship with the FBI as “troubled.”

In January 2000, Clarke wrote to Berger that the Millennium crisis showed that little progress had been made against Bin Laden and that the CSG feared the presence of “sleeper cells,” in the United States. This prompted a new four part agenda from the Principals committee. Some recommendations were adopted, others were not. Among the ones not adopted were the “centralized translation units for domestic intercepts.” Clinton, as Bush would later (see below) pushed the NSC to do more.

Clarke and others complained that the CIA was not spending enough on Bin Laden. The CIA told the staff compiling the 9/11 report that “Clarke kept promising more budget support, but could never deliver.” (Editor’s note: The reader will recall from above that “Presidential Directive 62, provided that the director (Clarke) would not direct operations, that the CSG would report to the Deputies Committee, and that the new structure would not change the established budget process.” )

In January 2000, the Clinton administration began to propose “significant increases in the overall intelligence budget.” The report describes the situation in 2000 with regards to the “counterterrorism” budget at the CIA as “critical,” and notes that the agency had “nearly exhausted available funds for the current fiscal year” from the alert period. “Frustration with funding levels was growing. In August 1999, the senior Defense Department participant in CSG noted that it seemed to him that the CIA was [“underfunding critical programs”] in the overt action budget for countering terrorism.

Berger and Tenet noted a need for amounts “in the order of $50-100 million,“ and that Clarke had “devised an innovative” development and analysis process for the counterterrorism budget across the government, but that “spending for the CIA, however, was handled under different procedures over which Clarke had less influence.” The White House and the CIA argued over whether the money should come from existing funds or new funds. “The CIA’s argument ultimately prevailed, and Congress adopted a supplemental appropriation.”

By August 2000 Clarke had outlined goals for the Clinton administration that he hoped it could accomplish before leaving office, in order to “significantly erode Al Qaeda’s leadership and infrastructure,” as well as to advance the Predator program, and to “gain the still-pending supplemental appropriations for the counterterrorism effort.”

Clarke also “urged that the CSG and the Principals Committee be ready for emergency meetings to decide whether to fire cruise missiles if Bin Laden were spotted by the Predator.” Berger wanted more information before action, such as “data on a pattern of movements to provide some assurance that Bin Ladin would stay in place.”

In September Clarke reported “truly astonishing imagery” and a “very high probability of a Bin Laden sighting” provided by the Predator. He was also described as more “upbeat about progress with disruption of al Qaeda cells elsewhere.” Clarke praised the effort and noted that this “was no time for complacency.”

On October 12, the U.S.S. Cole was attacked in Yemen. By November 11, Clarke and Berger reported to Clinton that “it was becoming increasingly clear that al Qaeda planned and directed the bombing.” Two weeks later, Clinton was “informed” that the FBI and CIA investigations had “not reached a formal conclusion.” Berger and Clarke expected that “the investigations would soon conclude that the attack” had been carried out by al Qaeda. Berger noted that there was an “unproven assumption” that al Qaeda was responsible.

The CIA reported to the principals that its “preliminary judgment” was that al Qaeda “appeared to have supported the attack,” but that it had no definitive answer on the “crucial question” of outside direction of the attack.

Clarke told the commission that “both the State Department and the Pentagon had reservations about retaliation (but that) the issue never came to a head because the FBI and the CIA had not provided a definitive conclusion about responsibility.” Clarke told the commission that Berger “upbraided DCI director Tenet so sharply after the Cole attack,” that Tenet walked out of a Principals Committee meeting.

In December 2000, the CIA produced the “Blue Sky Memo,” in which it forwarded “initiatives based on the assumption that policy and money were no longer constraints.” Editor’s note: This passage is highlighted because it signifies the two major problems which consistently seem to have hampered efforts toward more aggressive action, both in the Clinton and the subsequent Bush administration.

At the end of its term, the Clinton administration summed up the situation in a strategy paper titled “Strategy for Eliminating the Threat from Jihadist Networks of Qida: Status and Prospects.” The goal was to “roll back” al Qaeda over a period of three to five years.

Clarke responded: “Continued anti-al Qaida operations at the current level will prevent some attacks, but will not seriously attrit their ability to plan and conduct attacks.”

The Bush Administration

Clarke was retained. Rice knew him from “previous government experience,” and was “aware he was controversial, but she and Hadley thought they needed an experienced crisis manager in place during the first part of the administration.”

The report continues that Clarke, Rice and Hadley “concentrated Clarke’s responsibilities on terrorism issues,” and planned to spin off other of Clarke’s responsibilities to other parts of the NSC staff. “Clarke in particular wished to elevate the attention being given to the cybersecurity problem.”

According to the report: Bush asked VP Cheney, on May 8, to “chair an effort looking at preparations for managing a WMD attack and problems of national preparedness. It was just getting underway when the 9/11 attack occurred.”

Rice and Hadley decided that “ Clarke’s CSG should report to the Deputies Committee, chaired by Hadley, rather than bringing its issues directly to the principals. Clarke would still attend Principals Committee meetings on terrorism but without the central role he had played in the Clinton era Small Group.” Editor’s Note: This passage is highlighted due to the fact that it seems to point to a potentially significant change in which the flow of information was re-structured early in the Bush years. See above: In 1998, the Clinton administration prepared a new presidential directive on counterterrorism, which was meant to reinforce and strengthen “the importance President Clinton attached to unconventional threats at home and abroad and strengthen interagency coordination. The draft directive wold strengthen Clarke’s role by creating the position of a national coordinator for counterterrorism who would be a full member of the Principals Committee or Deputies Committee for meetings on this topic.” In his book, Clarke asserts that the Bush administration looked at terrorism as an “important” issue, not an “urgent” issue. This change in the chain of command, could be construed as evidence supporting Clarke’s claim.

The committee notes that this was indeed a source of friction: “Hadley told us that subordinating the CSG to the Deputies would help resolve counterterrorism issues in a broader context. Clarke protested the change, arguing that it would slow decision-making. Clarke told us that he considered this move a demotion to being a staffer rather than being a de facto principle on terrorism. On operations matters, however, Clarke could and did go directly to Rice.”

Clarke also told the commission that the “new team, having been out of government for at least eight years, had a learning curve to understand al Qaeda and the new transnational terrorist threat.”

Clarke “never briefed President Bush on counterterrorism,” according to the commission report, “a stark contrast from the relationship he had enjoyed with President Clinton.” Editor’s note: In her 3-28 60 Minutes interview, Rice told CBS’s Ed Bradley that Tenet and Bush met on al Qaeda 46 times. The key here, is that multiple sources, including the commission, have essentially and consistently described Clarke, as the person in the new administration, presumably with some access to the president, who knew the most about Al Qaeda. It is also important to note that the report notes that Clarke met with Bush, and briefed him on cyber terrorism. Rice also confirmed that Bush and Clarke met on Iraq after 9-11. There is no mention as to why Clarke never took the opportunity to mention al Qaeda and his concerns to Bush pre 9-11.

Clarke however did brief: “Secretary of State-designate Colin Powell, Rice, and Hadley on al-Qaeda, including a mention of [“sleeper cells,”] in many countries including the United States.” Clarke also briefed VP Cheney in the “early days of the administration.”

“Berger said he told Rice during the transition that she would spend more time on terrorism and al Qaeda than on any other issue.”

Hadley asked Clarke to “offer major initiatives.” Clarke forwarded the December 2000 strategy paper, noted above, and the original Delenda plan. Clarke laid out a proposal for urgent action by the new administration on assistance to the Northern Alliance, increasing funding to the CIA, choosing a standard of evidence on the U.S.S. Cole and deciding on a response, moving forward on reconnaissance missions with the Predator and preparing an armed version of the aircraft, and more work on terrorist fund raising.

Clarke asked for early Principal Committee meetings on these issues and was “frustrated that no early meeting was scheduled.” The report notes that Clarke wanted al Qaeda noted to be a “first order threat,” and not a “routine problem being exaggerated by [“chicken little”] alarmists.

No Principal Committee meetings on al Qaeda were held until September 4, 2001.

Rice and Hadley “said this was because the Deputies Committee needed to work through the many issues related to new policy on al Qaeda.” The report added that the Principals Committee did meet frequently before 9/11 on other subjects, “including Russia, the Persian Gulf, and the Middle East Peace process.”

Rice and Hadley told the committee that the Clinton administration policies on al Qaeda “had run out of gas.”

Hadley convened an “informal meeting,” at his level, including members of other agencies, not named in the report, on March 7. At the end of the meeting, the report states that “Clarke pressed for immediate decisions on covert assistance to the Northern Alliance and others, as well as for Predator reconnaissance missions. Development of a new presidential directive on terrorism was also discussed.”

The Northern Alliance aid proposal was moved into policy review but was not approved in April pending review of a broader package.

Rice and Hadley agreed with Clarke on the U.S.S. Cole, but along with the President didn’t want to “something weak,” and get involved in a “tit for tat” situation. There was no formal decision to retaliate. Hadley told the commission that the Bush administration’s response to the Cole attack would take the form of a more aggressive strategy on al Qaeda. The Bush administration proposed a 27% increase in funding for the CIA.

By the summer, Clarke thought the process was “slow,” and become “impatient for decisions on aid to the Northern Alliance and the Predator program,” issues managed by Hadley at the Deputies level. Hadley blamed the slow time on ”the time needed to get new officials confirmed and in place.” The Deputies Committee met seven times from April to September on issues related to al Qaeda, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. Editor’s note: This is the first allusion that suggests that Congressional stalling, perhaps due to political battles after the disputed election may have played a role in 9/11.

Rice told the commission that President Bush, in response to CIA Chief Tenet’s daily briefings, as early as May 2001, became impatient and wanted to stop “swatting flies,” while pushing his advisors to “do more.”

Rice then asked Clarke to put together “a broad policy to eliminate Al-Qaeda. Clarke thought that he already done that in December 2000 and had already presented it. Nevertheless, he produced a draft presidential directive, and in early June it was described by Hadley as “an admittedly ambitious program.”

From April to June, “alarming threat reports were coming in.” Clarke described them to Rice as a situation that “had reached a crescendo.” A great deal of activity took place, with a focus on international targets.

On July 2, the FBI “issued a national threat advisory.” The next day the CIA told CSG that Al Qaeda members “believe the upcoming attack will be [spectacular.]

On July 27, Clarke told rice and Hadley that the spike in intelligence seemed to have “ceased.” He also indicated that vigilance needed to remain high, since the attack seemed to have only “been postponed for a few months.”

In early August the CIA briefed the president on how terrorists might attack the U.S. “Neither the White House nor the CSG received specific, credible information about any threatened attacks on the U.S. Clarke and CSG were not informed of an August 2001 investigation that produced the “discovery of suspected al Qaeda operatives in the United States. Nor did the group learn about the arrest or FBI investigation of Zacarias Mousssaoui in Minnesota.”

Hadley and Rice agreed with the CIA about the Predators needing to be armed before flying, and argued with Clarke about this. Hadley sent the CIA a memo to have the Predators armed by September 1.

Rice thought the Clarke directive was “very good,” and wanted a brief review before submitting it to President Bush on September 4.

The first meeting of the Bush administration on al Qaeda matters took place on September 4. Clarke wrote to Rice, before this meeting, summarizing his frustrations. “He urged policy makers to imagine a day after a terrorist attack, and ask themselves what they could have done earlier. He criticized the military for not wanting to retaliate for the Cole attack. He accused senior CIA officials for blocking the Predator program.”

Although the commission report describes that action took place in the following days, the report ends with the sobering lines: Then came the attacks on September 11.”

Conclusion

The media, the public, the Democrats, and the Republicans, are looking for someone to blame the 9/11 debacle on. And this report from the 9/11 commission answers a great deal of how the blame, might be allocated.

The timeline above suggests that most of the trouble with the Bush administration happened at the Deputy level of the National Security Council where Rice’s deputy Hadley waited until September 4 to take what Richard Clarke thought was “urgent” to the President.

The finger of the commission’s report points to Rice, Hadley, and CIA director George Tenet. Tenet, especially seems to have a hard time explaining things based on the commission’s report. If he was meeting with Bush on a daily basis, what were they talking about?

There are other areas of potential problems, such as how the money got distributed, why it took so long to be appropriated, and why, despite repeated requests and orders from the White House, did the CIA take so long to arm the Predator aircraft?

On the Clinton side of the ledger, it seems fair to ask why when Clinton was so obsessed with terrorism, then why was the issue never raised as a major potential problem with the public, or why Clarke’s Delenda plan was “never” considered by Cabinet members as a “serious” policy. It seems fair to ask why covert actions were never ordered, or at least carried out by the CIA under its own initiatives. If the answer is that this failure was due to presidential election politics and the inner workings of the White House in recovery mode after the Lewinski debacle, or that the CIA was too busy with its own inner politics, then the Republican Congress, the CIA, and the Clinton White House should get a good share of the blame for 9/11. We hear nothing about this in the media.

Finally, Stratfor.com summed up the blame situation quite well when it said: “Sept. 11 was a systemic failure of the nation, for which both Democrats and Republicans are equally guilty. Bush's errors in judgment did not occur before the war, but after the war began. The current attempt to prove some spectacular failure by Bush before the war makes political sense, but it is intellectually incoherent and misses the places where Bush made genuine errors. Bush did fail. He failed to hold the intelligence community responsible for its failures, tear it apart and rebuild it. He failed to find a Nimitz to run the CIA. We regard this as an enormously serious charge against him. For the rest, he shares responsibility with his predecessor -- and with the rest of us.”

All roads here lead to the CIA, and Clarke as the two parties that were there the whole time, and to the Bush National Security Council, whose machinations in early 2001 slowed progress. Mr. Clarke is out of government, is starting to get public reprisals from some 9/11 families, is reportedly making a seven figure income from his book, and may face some major reprisals from the Bush administration for his book, his allegations, and the trouble he has caused the White House. Nevertheless, although he doesn’t believe that Bush could have done anything to prevent 9/11, he has exposed a great deal about the way the White House works under two rather opposite administrations.

Elsewhere, it will be interesting to see what happens to Ms. Rice, Mr. Tenet, and Mr. Hadley in the next few weeks. It seems to us that they have a lot of explaining to do.

PART 1   l   PART 2   l   PART 3

© 2004 Dr. Joe Duarte
Dr. Duarte's Bio and Archive

Joe Duarte, M.D.

Joe Duarte M.D. is founder and Editor in Chief of Joe-Duarte.com. Dr. Duarte is a board certified anesthesiologist, a registered investment advisor, and President of River Willow Capital Management, where he manages individual client accounts. His latest books "Successful Energy Sector Investing" and "Successful Biotech Investing" (Prima/Random House) are available on line at amazon.com, barnesandnoble.com, borders.com, Traders Press, and all major online and brick and mortar bookstores in the U.S., U.K. Europe, and Australia. Dr. Joe Duarte’s Daily Market I.Q. is a subscriber service that provides daily intelligence, trading strategies, and technical analysis at www.joe-duarte.com.