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Robert
R. Prechter, CEO
Elliot Wave
International
Conquer the Crash Revisited
Editor's
Note: We have edited the interview in this transcription for clarity
and readability.
The original real audio interview
may be heard on our Ask The
Expert page.
Charts
for Today's Interview
JIM
PUPLAVA:
Welcome back everyone, it’s time to introduce my special guest this
week. It’s a real treat to have Robert Prechter, Jr. back on the
program. Bob’s a chartered market technician. He began his
professional career in 1975 as a technical market specialist with
Merrill Lynch. He has also been publishing The
Elliott Wave Theorist, a monthly forecast publication, since 1979.
He is President of Elliott Wave International and he’s an executive
director of the Socionomic Institute, a research group. He’s received
various awards including winning the United States Trading Championship.
He was also awarded “Guru of the Decade” by the Financial News
Network in 1989. He has also been listed in Timer
Digest. He’s been published in various magazines, and he’s the
world’s leader in Elliott wave interpretation. He’s written 13 books
or coauthored 13 books, starting with Elliott
Wave Principle – Key to Market Behavior. His most recent successes
have been Pioneering Studies in
Socionomics and a book he wrote called Conquer
The Crash.
Bob,
I wanted to have you back on the program because you are one of the
foremost Deflationists I can think of and one thing that I think has
happened, which is a tribute to you I believe, is you have a lot of
copycats. There are a lot of
people who have taken your analysis and copied it as their own without
the attribution. So I wanted to have you back on the program, and since
our radio audience today is 4 to 5 times bigger than the last time we
had you I want to start out with the premise of Conquer
The Crash because many people may not yet have read it or may not be
aware of it.
ROBERT
PRECHTER:
Well, the premise of Conquer The
Crash is that a major turning point in the financial world was met
in the first quarter of 2000. The bull market that began in December of
1974 ended at that time, in the blue chip averages, and we have turned
the corner
into a completely different environment, which is going to be a
bear market environment very much like the 1930s and 40s. Nothing is
ever exactly the same as it was in a previous time, but I think there
are going to be quite a few similarities. Another time in history that
we should be copying to some degree is 1835 to 1859. These were times
when stock prices mostly went down and when commodities joined the trend
ultimately as well. So when I put those two things together I think what
we’re going to see is a deflationary environment, probably ending
about 7-10 years from now.
JIM:
Now Bob, one thing that has happened when the markets took off in March
2003, everybody’s calling
this a new bull market. I would take it from your technical views you
would disagree with this more in terms of, let’s say, a bear market
rally in a continuing bear market trend.
BOB:
Well, you’re
exactly right and in fact I’m
extremely bearish at the moment. We have a tremendous list of technical
negatives in the market. But the important ones are that the retracement
level in the S&P500, the main representative of stocks that we have,
was about 58%. That’s a normal bear market retracement. I think it’s
over. I think it ended in March. But whether you try to call the exact
month is not that important. What matters is that the optimism that has
been generated by these two up years has matched -- and in some
indicators even exceeded -- the optimism we had at the all time high in
the first quarter of 2000. Just to give you a perspective, or to give
your listeners some perspective, on this absolutely amazing situation,
ever since the October 1998 sell-off -- that’s when South East Asia
had its meltdown -- the market came out of that low and the Investor’s
Intelligence group, which reports on the percentage of advisors who are
bullish and bearish, showed a plurality of bulls from that point onward.
And despite the fact that the S&P lost 50% of its value and the
Nasdaq lost over 75% of its value in the meantime, we’ve now gone 339
weeks since that point, 6 ½ years,
and in only nine of those weeks were there more bears than bulls,
despite the terrorist attack, the collapse in stock prices and
everything else. It’s the biggest top formation that has ever existed,
and it’s the flip-side of the bottom formation that occurred between
1974 and 1982, and I think this top is about over.
JIM:
Now if we look at that recovery which begin March 2003, we had a nice
upward move in stock prices, all the way into, let’s say, the first
quarter of 2004. But from that point forward until really probably the
last six weeks of 2004 this stock market spent most of its time digging
in negative territory, until the last six weeks of the year and here we
are again in the year 2005, and at least at this juncture you’ve got
the Nasdaq down 5%, the Dow is down over 2, and we’ve got the S&P
down.
BOB:
You are
absolutely correct. In fact the Dow -- and actually very few people
realize this because of the bullish feelings out there -- the Dow is
absolutely unchanged from January/February of 2004 to where it is right
today.
JIM:
It’s amazing because one area that has done well in the last couple of
weeks has been technology stocks, especially the semiconductor stocks,
but if you look at them fundamentally the sales are roughly where they
were in 1998 and then also collectively as an industry the bulk of those
sales are occurring overseas.
BOB:
You point is
obviously key: people are overvaluing stocks tremendously. What I
focused on in the June issue in one section, just to show people that
prices in stocks can be way, way out of whack with so-called
fundamentals, is the Dow Jones Transportation Average. The companies
collectively in that index have net losses. They don’t even have any
earnings, and yet the index in 1998 had tremendous earnings, $300 a
share, and oil was trading at $11 a barrel. Now oil’s at $55 a barrel.
It’s gone up 5 times, the earnings are negative and yet the stocks
went up 65% into the peak in March of this year! Now that is an amazing
situation and tells you that people are in a dream world in terms of
pricing stocks. We can’t necessarily call the exact turn of when this
dream world will end. It’s already gone on longer than I thought it
would, but some of the recent figures we have in just the last couple of
weeks say that it’s hard to imagine an extremity greater than this,
and that tells me this rally is over.
JIM:
You’re also seeing some of the same type of characters play out in the
market. Recently for example Google which has roughly an $80 billion
market cap with only $3 billion in sales, less than $1 billion in
profits, we have analysts saying Google was a $300 stock. Then, not to
be outdone, another analyst came out and said it was $350, then another
one came out and said, “Well, I’ll top that, $375.”
BOB:
Does that
remind you of anything?
JIM:
Probably 97-99.
BOB:
Exactly.
JIM:
So we’re seeing the same kind of behavior. Let’s talk about
something also that we’ve seen that has been somewhat odd, and that is
the behavior of the bond market, Mr. Greenspan’s conundrum. We’ve
had the Fed raise interest rates 8 times, possibly 9 this month, and yet
long term rates have come down; we’ve got 30 year Treasuries below 4
½% and the 10 year Treasury roughly around the 4% level.
BOB:
I think the
answer to that is the time-honored -- although not honored by economists
-- Kondratieff cycle. We are in the downward phase of this cycle. We
have been for a while. The tremendous credit expansion -- what I call
the Great Levitation -- has kept things floating here for the last 5
years. But the normal situation for this time of the cycle is for
interest rates on strong bonds, that is bonds issued by someone people
believe will pay them back,
to go down. Japan was ahead of the curve on this, and its bonds went way
down in yield to under 1% and have been staying there for quite a long
time. I think the U.S. bond market is slowly catching up to what Japan
has been doing on the leading edge. This is pretty normal but, and this
is where most people are going to get in trouble, the vast majority of
bond issues out there are not safe. The only bonds that are going to
stay very low in their yields are those bonds that are going to pay off
ultimately, and that is an extremely small percentage of the total
amount of dollar denominated debt outstanding in the world. I think some
of the worst investments you can make right now are corporate bonds and municipal
bonds. I think people are making a mistake even when they are buying
them cheap, for example the General Motors bonds. I mean, once we head
into the next leg down we are going to have another economic contraction
just as we did in 2001, and the issuers of these bonds are going to be
hard pressed to pay them off.
JIM:
Certainly if we take the case of General Motors where they have over
$300 billion in debt and I
think equity that doesn’t even come close to paying that, I don’t
see how they survive. They continue to lose market share, and the area
that they are making money, which is in the lending department,
they’re making more money making loans than they are making cars. Same
thing with Ford.
BOB:
I agree. And I
think the only reason that many of these companies are staying alive is
this dream world that investors are living in, in terms of valuation.
For example, if we were having a runaway inflation now, bonds would be
getting crushed. If we were having a big bear market, stocks would be
getting crushed. Yet investors have bulled up the price of absolutely
everything. They’ve pushed up the price of bonds, they’ve pushed up
the price of stocks, they’ve pushed up the price of commodities. It
doesn’t make financial sense, except in the sense that this is all
credit, and it’s going to come collapsing down at some point. So I
think I know why this is happening. We were forecasting several years
ago that the recoveries would be homogenous across the board. I didn’t
think it would last this long, and I didn’t think they
would go this high, but this is the kind of thing that happens
late in the Kondratieff cycle: liquidity is driving everything. The Fed
played a lot of cards in the last few years. I think they are pretty
much out of ammunition. They claim they are not, but I think they are.
JIM:
Has it surprised you in the sense that another assumption in your book Conquer
the Crash is a deflationary depression? If we take a look at the
downturn that came in 2000, the collapse of the Nasdaq bubble, the
recession, the events of 9/11, what made what happened afterwards
somewhat different is if we contrast the recession of 2001 to the
recession of 91, people
acted responsibly: when Greenspan brought interest rates down. People
refinanced their homes; they took that extra cash flow, they paid down
debt; they built up their savings; they stopped spending; there was pent
up demand. That did not happen this time: we had runaway spending; a new
bubble that developed in real estate; we had a mortgage bubble that
developed, consumption fed off of that with equity takeouts. I mean this
wasn’t responsible action if we compare this to previous recessions.
BOB:
I agree
completely, and I think ultimately Greenspan will be known as the guy
who created all these bubbles, or at least nursed them along. Ultimately
human beings are the ones who decide to go out and borrow the money,
even when it’s cheap to do so. They don’t really have to.
But I
think there is one big myth out there in terms of the 2001 recession,
that is that it ended. If you look at the manufacturing jobs in this
economy, they continue to collapse. There’s been no recovery to speak
of. Three million jobs have been lost in the manufacturing area. We
can’t survive as a producing country just doing each other’s
laundry, providing services for each other. So I think this recession is
worse. I think actually we started a depression in 2000 and 2001, but
people don’t recognize that we’re in a depression because we’re
not in the bottom. They say, “I don’t see any bread lines.” Well,
as soon as you see the bread lines, it’s the low. That’s when you
want to start buying stocks, commodities and precious metals and
everything else because then the deflation will be over. But we are in
the very early stages of a depression, and the country is basically
falling apart. What hasn’t fallen apart yet is the optimism, the
confidence and the dream world that people are in, but that is going to
happen.
JIM:
It’s amazing when you examine government statistics. I for one -- and
I’ll go on record -- don’t believe the GDP numbers. They are
massaged, we have imputations, we have a lot of things that go into the
GDP figures that aren’t real. In other words they are dollars that are
not created anywhere. Nobody creates them as a manufacturer or as a
producer or pays them as a consumer. But you bring up something that is
rather interesting because up till, let’s say 10-15 years ago when we
began to massage these numbers, and you saw this in the 91 recession,
they said it was a recovery in 92 but they were calling it a “jobless
recovery” because we were losing jobs, we weren’t adding jobs. The
same thing happened this time around.
BOB:
Yes, that’s
right. It sounds like an oxymoron doesn’t it?
I
agree with you, Jim. I don’t trust the GDP numbers either, and I’m
not a conspiracy theorist, but government always tries to massage
numbers. I think this is the normal way they do business. But here is
one reason why I seriously question the idea that we’ve had much of a
recovery out of the low in 2001: In the past century, never has a
recession ended before the stock market bottomed. And in this case they
claimed the recession ended in late 2001 and yet the stock market went
ahead and made a new low in 2002, a year later. That has never happened
before. The stock market is a leading indicator of changes in the
economy. To me the only way that can possibly be the case is if the
numbers are being massaged. And it could be part of the fact that credit
has grown so much that they’re just valuing things upward that
actually, in terms of their real value, are worse off than they were
before, like so many of these prices in dollar terms that we’ve
experienced in the last couple of years.
JIM:
You know another phenomenon that I think we’ve seen since 2001 that is
unlike the previous recession in 1991. I’m just looking at, for
example, the Flow of Funds at the Fed. Last year we had foreign central
banks buy $262 billion worth of Treasuries. We had foreign institutions
buy $96 billion worth of Treasuries, and we had the Fed monetizing over
$42 billion. So collectively, foreign central banks and the Fed itself
in essence monetized nearly $400 billion worth of securities, which was
more than the government or Treasury issued in bonds last year.
BOB:
Yes, and
that’s the source of our tremendous credit expansion. And again, I
think the purchasing of that debt is all due to confidence, and once
that cracks, and the stock market is the signal of that, the whole world
is going to look different.
One
really interesting thing I’m sure you’ve experienced in your study
of history: A lot of people when things change will say, “Oh my gosh!
what a sudden change that was. Gee, just a couple of months ago we all
thought this, and now look, everything is falling apart,” or sometimes
vice versa, everybody’s worried and 3 months later things are fine.
They don’t realize that the recognition point when people wake up and
say “everything is changing” was the result of a long process. And
this time the process has been outrageously long; it has taken many,
many years. But the problem is not so much what the Fed and people are
doing at the moment, it’s what they’ve been doing for the last 20
years, and that is reinforcing the credit bubble we’ve been in and all
the bull markets that it has supported. I think it is going to turn
turtle and go the other way, and when it does it’s going to be a
breathtaking thing to watch, but it won’t be out of the blue.
JIM:
Do you think it will be something like what happened to the stock market
in 2000, because certainly the Fed began raising interest rates in the
summer of 1999. They raised it all the way most of 2000 with the same
kind of comments that you hear Mr. Greenspan say on Capitol Hill. He’s
confident the economy is at a level of long term stability, sustainable
growth, and all of a sudden, boom, things fall off a cliff very
suddenly. And when you have the amount of debt we have in the US today,
whether it’s government, whether it’s corporate, whether it’s
municipal or individual, how far do you think they are going to get
away, because at least as of last week Mr. Greenspan was confident that
everything was rosy?
BOB:
It’s a little bit like what happened in the 20s and 30s. The Fed
raised rates in the late 20s and everything started to fall apart, and
they were a little late in following it down by lowering rates. This
time they were much more aggressive. From 1932-1937, the market finally
rebounded. It was the most rapid bull market, actually, for its period
of time in the last century. And then there were a couple of up-ticks in
rates and the market suddenly crashed again in 1937 and 1938, and people
blamed it on that. I think the Fed is pretty much a reactionary group
and when it’s lowering interest rates you can tell they’re afraid,
and when they’re raising them it just means their confidence is
returning. I don’t think they are making things happen, generally
speaking. So it tells you, yes, they are not worried any more; they
really do think this recovery is sustainable. But last time they were
able to lower rates from a very high level, 6%. This time they’ve got
less than half that. So I think their quiver is low on arrows.
JIM:
Let’s talk about the consequences of Conquer
The Crash. The conclusion was that the U.S. would enter into a
deflationary depression. That has not happened. Why?
BOB:
Well, I think
we are in it. We are in a depression. We haven’t begun deflation yet,
that’s true, but you can also see a lot of signs that it is extremely
difficult for manufacturers and other people selling their goods and
services to do anything about it. Car prices keep going lower because of
the competition from abroad. There’s a lot of what I call deflationary
psychology because there are people who can barely make ends meet, and
the reason they are surviving is something you alluded to earlier: So
many foreigners are buying our bonds that people are borrowing their way
into survival. Obviously that can’t go on forever.
Now
instead of printing currency, what the Fed has mostly been doing is
encouraging people to take on more debt, and the government has been
taking on more debt right along with them. Debt is something that can
contract and collapse, and I think that is what’s around the corner.
There
has been a reprieve. I’d like to put it this way. In 1974, late 74
early 75, I was very bullish on the stock market. It took off for two
years up into December of 1976, and then it spent a number of years
testing the lows. It went down into 1978, it rallied, came back down in
1980, rallied again, and yet a third time in 1982 it came down and
tested the low one more time. People were pretty disgusted by this
point, they were pretty bearish, they were giving up on the great bull
market idea, and that’s exactly when it took off. Well, we have the
same situation now, but it’s inverted. We had the peak in 2000. I
don’t think I was wrong by saying that from that point we were going
to head into a depression, but what we’ve had now is a test of the
highs. We’ve had some obscure indexes go to new highs, but the ones
that are really representing most of what people own, like the S&P
and so on, are not. They are below the highs, just as in 1978, 80 and 82
the Dow stayed above its low of 74 and didn’t go to a new low. I
don’t think we are going to go to a new high. So it is a second
attempt to go back towards the highs. It’s a top-building process,
just as we went through a bottom-building process.
This one has lasted five years. The bottom lasted eight years. I
don’t think this can hang on for eight years, but who knows? It has
already lasted longer than I thought. We’ll just have to see.
JIM:
Let’s talk about this system we have today of fiat currencies, where
money is basically backed by nothing, and when you have money and credit
expand rapidly there always seem to be some sectors that inflate while
others deflate, either in relative or absolute terms. For example if we
look at between 2000 and 2003, at least the first part of it, we had a
deflating stock market. Certainly you would call it that if you look at
the Nasdaq, which lost over 70% of its value. But during that period of
time from 2000, actually 1998, we had the beginnings of a real estate
bubble. So as this money and credit was injected into the system, as the
Fed pumped money furiously and also as foreign central banks came into
the U.S., we got the mortgage consumption real estate bubble. Is it
possible with central banks acting, and some would say, in unison --
Richard Duncan who wrote The
Dollar Crisis said that in the first quarter of 2003 to the first
quarter of 2004 Japan printed $323 billion, US dollars, and bought our
debt. That was more than they did in the previous decades. Is it
possible, Bob, in your opinion, that in this fiat currency world in
which we live we could see some areas deflate, whether it’s real
estate coming next or it was the stock market previous to that and other
areas inflate.
BOB:
What you are
really asking is can prices in some sectors go up while others go down.
And yes, I would say that’s true. When we’re talking about inflation
and deflation, I think you’d agree that it’s a matter of the money
and credit supply, and so far that hasn’t contracted, so we haven’t
had any deflation in the true sense of the word. What I think is
happening here is like an EKG of somebody having a heart attack, and
it’s going crazy. We’re having the peak of this amazing expansion in
credit from 1933 when the Fed finally decided, “We can’t live with
this deflation stuff anymore and we’re going to make credit available
no matter what.” We’ve had 72 years of it now, but we are in the
topping area. They have saturated society with debt to the point that
people can barely hang on, but they are trying to. So you are getting
these surges in various areas. It peaked in the Nasdaq, as you say, in
2000. Now it’s the real estate market, and in between it has been
everything from Beanie Babies to various commodities, and as soon as
those things run up they tend to fall apart again. So people are losing
money every time they bet on one of these things, and I think it is the
flipside of what we lived through in 1974-1982. Every
time people were bearish back then, they were wrong, and ultimately I
think the people who were bullish on all these markets are going to be
wrong as well. But living through it is no picnic.
JIM:
Let’s talk about a different kind of phenomenon that we’ve seen
operate elsewhere. Most people would agree that inflation is primarily a
wartime phenomenon: Governments expand the money supply, we consume
massive amounts of commodities, and we destroy massive amounts of
things, but there were periods even recently where you had numerous
countries especially in Latin America, Turkey, Russia, and parts of
Asia, where inflation came about with actually the currencies of those
countries falling faster than the price rise, and we saw this in the
Weimar Republic. So what you saw in essence was a deflation even though
nominal prices were going up, real prices were coming down. Could that
happen here?
BOB:
Yes, in fact in
Conquer The Crash I say I
think the ultimate workout of all this will be hyperinflation, but not
until we get deflation first. What happened in Germany in the 20s,
1922-1923, was the printing of banknotes. Now mostly what the Fed does
is make credit available, and they make it easy for banks to lend. So
people are going to the banks and borrowing. Every one of these things
is an IOU. It’s not a dollar in their pockets; in fact the number of
greenbacks is very small. So hyperinflation would have to come after the
collapse in credit. If the Fed or the government began to print
greenbacks now as they did in the Weimar Republic, what would happen is
the entire credit house of cards would fall apart because people would
look at it and say, “We can’t hold these bonds, these trillions of
dollars worth that are out there worldwide, anymore because the Fed is
going to destroy them by printing bank notes.” I think the Fed is
walking a tightrope 500 feet above the canyon. They can’t do what the
Weimar Republic did. And of course there were also some extenuating
circumstances back then in terms of the World War I debt that they were
demanded to pay, the reparations, so they just decided, “Fine, we’ll
give you what you want; we’ll just print it and you can have it.” We
don’t have that situation today, and I think the integrity of the
credit market is the most important thing that the Fed has going for it.
As soon as that falls apart, which it eventually will, it’s going to
lose its power around the world, but I think it’s going to want to
fight to keep it alive. I absolutely do not think that they are going to
begin printing banknotes, and even if they do it’s going to cause
initially a deflationary crash. It may only last a year instead of the
number of years I think it will because the credit market would have to
basically fall apart completely as people realize all the Fed was doing
was replacing debt with currency. That isn’t beginning, but as you
were saying, is it possible? Yes. Ultimately, after the deflation, I
think it is more than possible; I think it’s likely.
JIM:
And is it possible in an interim period of time they can get somebody
else to do their dirty work as a surrogate as one might argue, let’s
say, the Bank of Japan, or the Bank of China serves today.
BOB:
What do you
mean, “do their dirty work”?
JIM:
In other words, instead of the Feds printing money the Bank of Japan and
the Bank of China prints money and buys our debt.
BOB:
I don’t think
that they have any different situation because their markets for credit
are also very large, and they haven’t shown any desire to destroy
them. So far it really hasn’t happened. What has happened is what has
happened from the beginning, from 1933, and that is that the Fed is
facilitating credit. Now if someone shows me someday that they have
started the machine pumping the dollars out, then I guess I’d say they
are changing their approach, but it still won’t change the fact that
they have created these multi-trillion-dollar credit markets, and those
credit markets are not going to take kindly to that kind of activity;
they will have to collapse. So I don’t see how in the world we can
avoid having deflation, and I think the fact that so many prices have
stalled, for example, most of the agricultural commodities have had 30%
declines sometime in the last year and a half, silver stalled out over a
year ago, and gold stalled out six months ago. These markets are telling
us that despite the increase in credit they smell something different.
They are saying there is something else around the corner, “we’re
not going up because we don’t think this is sustainable,” and I
don’t think it is sustainable. Credit balloons, bubbles, always get
deflated.
JIM:
Let’s talk about something within commodities that is certainly
standing out and is certainly is critical to Western industrialized
society, which is energy. We’re looking at oil prices at $55/barrel.
Last week a book was released by probably one of the foremost energy
experts in the world, a gentleman by the name of Matthew Simmons. The
name of the book is called Twilight in the Desert. It’s Simmons’ thesis in this book that
Saudi Arabian oil [production] has peaked. If it hasn’t peaked
already, it is close to peaking and when that happens world oil
production will have peaked, and from that point it’s a decline curve
and of course energy permeates just all sections of our industrialized
society. What happens? Does that alter your forecast?
BOB:
No. You’re
just saying the price will go up because the supply went down. That
wouldn’t have anything to do with inflation or deflation. So that
doesn’t speak to anything we’ve been talking about. But I’m
calling for one of the biggest depressions ever, and in those
environments you get all kinds of disruptions, and I’m certain that
cutoffs of fuel are going to be one of those disruptions. There’s
probably no doubt about it. But also you have to realize where I come
from when I do my analysis. I am mostly a market psychologist. I am
looking at the kind of statements people are making, the kind of
arguments they are making. We keep 25 or 30 different indicators on the
psychology of the various markets we follow. It tells us what people are
doing and what they are saying. Nobody was going apoplectic over the
world running out of oil back when it was eleven dollars a barrel. You
didn’t hear any of that. Everyone was complacent in 1998. So when you
get near tops, you get all the wild forecasts and, just as with Google,
everyone tries to outdo the other and one guy says we are going to run
out of oil in 2060, and the other guy says no it’ll be 2030 and
another guy says it will five years from now. So it’s the same kind of
psychology going on at this peak. While I was attending the last couple
of conferences I was really surprised to see how many people were
opening up booths and making speeches about how to make money in the oil
market. I haven’t seen that before, and it’s generally a sign of a
top. Again, it doesn’t mean we are 5 minutes away from the peak in oil
prices right now, but I would certainly say it’s much more likely from
a psychological standpoint that oil’s going to go a lot lower than
people think over the next 5 or 6 years.
JIM:
I want to come back to something on this massive amount of credit.
There’s been some criticism against the bond market, in fact some may
argue that the bond market has been bought off with the carry trade. If
we’re seeing inflation in the consumer price index, it’s certainly
gone up even with the massaging. You really don’t care, if you’re a
bond investor, if you can borrow at 2 or 3% if you can play market
spreads and go in and get 8 or 9%, who cares about inflation when
you’re making that kind of money on borrowed money?
BOB:
Well, it
depends. I think people trying to make money in anything yielding over
2% are taking a risk. The ultimate risk is the payback of principal, and
that to me is the most amazing thing, that the overall bond market has
held up as long as it has. We’ve seen this tremendous expansion in the
credit supply, as you are pointing out, and continuing movements up
every single year in the CPI, and yet the bond market stays robust.
It’s an absolutely amazing situation. It is unsustainable. It’s this
dream world psychology that “Everything is fine, it’ll continue to
be fine and we’ll continue to have mild inflation bailing us
all out, we can have our bull market and our slow moving prices at the
same time,” but it can’t be sustained. I think that the issuers of
these bonds aren’t going to pay off the people that have invested in
them. It’s a hot potato game. They’re passing it around from one
person to another, and when they finally realize that there is not
enough production to pay all this debt off, it will be coincident with
the next big wave down in stock prices. And the next wave down isn’t
going to be like 2001 and 2002. This one should be much more relentless
and cover much more territory on the downside.
JIM:
Do you think that downside could be accelerated if at the same time
we’re experiencing a deflating of the real estate bubble? Because one
of the comments -- I know you follow a lot of the market psychology
indicators -- but in talking to people, in talking to potential clients,
the kind of emails we got here at Financial Sense, “Well, I know my
401K is down 40% but you know I’ve got 20 years to retirement, I’m
into it for the long run, but you know, hey, my house is up 50%.”
BOB:
You hardly know
what to say to someone like that. He jumps out of one pot that has
boiled his skin and he jumps into another one. This has been a rolling
series of bubbles. Rather than learning from them, so many people are
saying, “This one is the true uptrend that will never end,” and
it’s not. As you point out, it’s a bubble, supported by credit. And
that’s what bubble means in my opinion; it’s not just a market that
is way up. Some people will call any rising market a bubble, and
that’s not true, there has to be extensive credit supporting it and it
has to permeate society, and that’s certainly true of the real estate
market today. I think one of the signs of the fact that this is a
terminal time for the real estate market is that people are no longer
buying homes to live in; they are buying them to flip, they are buying
them to speculate. It’s an incredible situation, and again, how long
it can last we can’t be certain, but it’s very much as we saw in
late 1999. It wasn’t just the blue chip stocks anymore, it was
Internet stocks with absolutely no value going from $1 to $50, 60 or 70
and doing the whole round trip. It’s that kind of froth we are seeing
right now in the real estate market. If there were a way to short it, I
would do it, but the best you can do now is to sell some REITs, which I
think is a great speculation.
JIM:
Bob, let’s talk about the solution before we get to some conclusions.
In Conquer The Crash, why
don’t you go over for our listeners given what you see coming
ultimately, which is a deflationary depression, followed by
hyperinflation. How would you best prepare for that?
BOB:
Here’s one
interesting thing. Where I finished that book in March of 2002, the peak
that month in the Dow was 10673, well it’s 10547 right now, so it’s
virtually unchanged. I’m as surprised as anyone it’s had that kind
of recovery, but there is absolutely no difference in the
recommendations I am making for people to get out of the way of the
danger that I see is coming. And it’s very, very simple. It’s to do
virtually the opposite of what most financial advisors are recommending
that people do. And what are they recommending? They are recommending
that people take their hard earned money and put it in risky areas such
as the stock market, which as you say lost 40% for the average investor
in 2000 based on the hottest 50 mutual funds sold that year, and they
are putting it into other things such as commodity funds, which I think
have had a nice run in dollar terms, not in euro terms, but in dollar
terms, I think that is already reversing, so they’re going to be in
trouble. But the biggest area of all is real estate, and people think it
won’t come down, and the banks that are lending money to people to buy
these homes don’t think it can come down either, or they wouldn’t be
lending 90 cents on the dollar. So it’s a tremendous accident waiting
to happen, and I guess you and I are just getting tired of waiting, but
you can’t change, I think, the inevitable weight of the credit bubble
that we have. It’s so large and so pervasive that the ultimate outcome
I think is virtually assured, and that is, it’s going to collapse.
JIM:
Let’s talk about gold. You’re bearish on gold in the short term;
longer term you are bullish on gold. There’s a difference between you
and me on gold. I’m still bullish on gold. Explain your position on
gold and why you would stay out of it now and when you would be in it?
BOB:
I’ll tell you
when I would be in it:
February 2001. I put out a special page that month. Gold was trading at
$255/oz, and I said it looks to me as if it’s going to rally about
$100/oz. And that’s in the midst of what I was considering a bear
market, so I was taking a very contrary stand. There were very few bulls
around at the time. I underestimated how far it would go because when it
got to $360, I got out. I don’t know if you remember ,but it edged up
to $380 and fell immediately to $320, and we were short for that. So I
made some money there, and then I said, “I’m out of it for now,
I’m not bullish, I’m bearish, but we’re not taking a position.”
What’s happened since then is that gold has continued to rally, but
only in dollar terms, not in terms of the euro. So really what has
happened since then -- that last $95 in gold, or most of it anyway --
was pretty much a reflection of the change, that is the decline, in the
value of the dollar. So I decided this is a very interesting thing to
look at. When you have extremely diverging trends in the dollar price
and the euro price of gold, what does it mean? So in the June issue,
which I just published, I’ve got a chart on page 6 tracing gold from
1979 all the way to the present, and it shows you that when the trends
of gold in dollar terms and in euros, which used to be deutschmarks
essentially, are moving in the same direction, you have a true move in
gold. It’s either a bear market move or a bull market move. There are
times, in fact there were two major times in that period, when they
diverged from each other, and one of them was at the 1985 bottom.
There’s an extreme divergence where gold was cheap in dollar terms and
expensive in deutschmark terms, and what happened? Gold turned around
and soared from that point up to its 1987 high. But then we had the
opposite situation in 1995-96. It was going up in dollar terms and going
down in terms of the deutschmark. What happened then? We had one of the
biggest slides in gold, from $500 down to $250. It was cut in half. In
the last year we have had the same thing that happened in 1995 and early
96, the extreme move up in dollar price and not responding in terms of
the euro. So I think it’s the same set-up we had back then. And
that’s just one of many things we could talk about if you want to keep
going, I wouldn’t mind.
JIM:
Please do, because one thing that I think is unusual right now is
what’s happening with the euro. Why don’t we talk about the euro and
its relation to gold because you are right, we have not seen until
recently gold break out against the other currencies. It’s been mainly
a dollar event.
BOB:
Well there are
some other really interesting things going on in the gold market. From
the standpoint of the price forms, Elliott waves -- that’s what I use
as my primary tool -- we had a recovery in gold from 1982 until 1987. It
lasted 5 years and 6 months, and what we had from 1999-2004 was 5 years
and 3 months. It was exactly the same move in percentage terms, and in
fact in the last couple of months we finally figured out what was going
on and anticipated that high in the $450s, and that’s so far where
it’s topped out. So you’ve got two bear market rallies that are
virtually identical. It’s been – what? -- six months almost since
gold topped in December. Now if we go above that high then I’m
probably going to have rethink things. But because of what I have just
mentioned about the big spread between gold prices in dollars and gold
prices in euros and also the tremendous divergence between gold and
silver I don’t think that’s likely. And this is the third area that
I think is very important. In 1987, for example, silver topped out in
April of that year and had some more rallies but it was pretty much
over. Gold kept going up until December, and that’s when it finally
topped out and had that tremendous drop that we talked about earlier.
Well, we had almost the same thing happen in 2004. Silver made its peak
in March. It’s had several rallies since, but it has failed to make a
new high. Gold continued higher and finally topped -- guess when -- in
December. So you’ve got almost the identical situation in both of
these bear market rallies. As long as silver continues to fail to take
out its high of early 2004, I would say you’ve still, on that basis,
got a set-up for a bear market, or at least one more wave down in a bear
market. So I’m bearish from at least 3 different standpoints. Who
knows? I don’t have to be right about it, but the evidence to me is
overwhelming: you don’t want to be in the metals or in the metal
stocks at this time.
JIM:
Bob, as in any kind of forecast there are things that change, the world
evolves, it changes. What are the things in your mind that would change
or have to change to cause your
view to change from a deflationary depression?
BOB:
That’s a good
question. I think one of the things that would have to happen is a
confirmed new high in gold and silver together. That would wipe out much
of the negative development that I see at the moment. You’d have to
see gold going up in terms of all the currencies. If it doesn’t, then
gold may get into a bull market in dollar terms, but then gold is not
the only thing that you need to own. You’re welcome to be bullish on
gold but you may as well hold Swiss francs. So the key here is, is it
just a dollar fall, or is gold going to be in a great bull market? I
guess that is the main thing that would make me change.
I’d
like to add one other observation. This is on page 9 of the issue I just
put out. Very few people know about this, and it is a fascinating
connection -- in fact, if we can, I’d like to post this chart on the
website along with this talk -- and that is how closely silver has
actually been going up and down with the stock market and the economy.
Most precious metal bugs say that gold and silver are contra-cyclical,
but in fact silver has been trading as an industrial metal for a long,
long time. It peaked in April 1987, and a couple months later in August
the Dow topped out and had a crash. Silver collapsed throughout the
entire period. It went from ten bucks down to $4. It bottomed in
February 91 and, if you remember, that was right near the end of the
recession of 90-91. So it bottomed in the middle of a recession. So
that’s going with the cycle and not against. Silver then started going
up along with the stock market and topped next time in April 1998. Do
you remember what happened then? That was the high in the Value Line
geometric stock average. It still hasn’t been taken out to this day.
Then silver started down and bottomed in December 2001, which was one
month after the recession of 2001 ended. So it’s almost identical to
the February 1991 low. Then silver took off, the economy recovered and
topped out at March-November 2004, while the stock market appears to
have topped in March 2005. So I think again it’s pretty much on
schedule again. If I’m right, we are heading into a depression. Then
according to this oscillation silver should go down as well. So when you
look at cycles, you look at the economy, you look at the
non-confirmation against gold, the exclusivity of the dollar move as
opposed to the euro or anything else, and to me it all adds up to a
selective bull market that is likely to be reversed.
JIM:
When I asked you previously what would have to change and you would have
to say new highs for gold and silver. Is there a level in silver and
gold you would like to see
before you would have to say I need to go back and examine this?
BOB:
Well, gold
topped at $457/oz, so if it goes above there and silver goes above its
high of early 2004 which was, what, $8.20-8.30, then I would have to say
something is going on that is changing the technical situation.
Sometimes the technical situation can change, and I am looking at data
every single day to make sure that we are on track here. But I really
think if your readers want to get a feel for it, I’ve got four whole
pages discussing all this in the latest issue, and if they want to get a
hold of it that will tell them exactly why I think what I think.
JIM:
Bob, there are a couple of things that I would like to say here. Number
one, I think you and I both agree on deflation. It’s just a matter of
when it comes. You believe we get deflation first, then hyperinflation.
I’m leaning more towards hyperinflation-deflation, so there’s
agreement and I would say, or at least you would say that at least from
both our perspectives at this point I can’t
prove that we are in hyperinflation and we haven’t had
deflation.
BOB:
You know we
might even agree on a reasonable -- even if it weren’t our favorite --
investment for either environment. I had recommended in Conquer The Crash the Swiss money-market claims, which are
essentially Swiss Treasury bills, and they went way up. They soared 50%
in value, and I did it for safety reasons, not to get rich. If the
dollar is the currency that you feel is going to hyperinflate, then
you’d probably be reasonably happen with that as an investment, maybe
not your number one investment, and it’s not my number one investment
because I turned bullish on the dollar late last year, and that has been
great for us by the way. That was a very contrary opinion and had the
same sort of bearishness out there as we see bullishness in oil today,
but that’s a sideline at the moment. Now, if you’re thinking every
currency will hyperinflate, then gold is your only choice.
JIM:
You know we do agree on that because we’ve owned Swiss government
bonds here for the last 2 ½ years. The only difference is if we
hyperinflate then I think you are absolutely right and if all currencies
go down then gold’s going to be that choice. But right now I think we
agree on bonds. We agree on interest rates and also the stock market.
It’s just that at this point we haven’t seen the hyperinflation yet.
It hasn’t played out that way but I think it could, nor have we seen
the deflation play out your way. I think it’s been frustrating for
both of us.
Bob,
anything else that you would like to call our listeners’ or our
readers’ attention to that you think is significant over a three to
six month time horizon, anything your charts or reading of psychology is
telling you?
BOB:
Oh man! There
are a lot of things I’d like to say.
JIM:
Say ’em.
BOB:
I made a list
in the recent Elliott Wave
Theorist of all the technical negatives piling up in the stock
market. They are just as exciting to me as they were in late 1999. I
think the next leg down is probably going to be underway by the time you
get this thing posted. It’s very, very exciting and we can hardly keep
up with the amazing readings we are getting on so many indicators. But
if there’s one thought I’d like to leave your listeners with, it’s
that I’m a safety advocate
right now. The people who wrote books saying you should own stocks for
the long run because they will save you didn’t realize what people do
when they are told buy stocks. They go out and buy the most popular
mutual funds. Now the average mutual fund may be only down 15 or 20
percent, which I believe is about where it is after this recovery, but
the funds that people went out and purchased in 1999 and 2000, a few
weeks ago were down an average -- this is an average, as some of them
were down much more -- an average of 43%! And this is after this
tremendous recovery. You can only imagine what they are going to be like
once we are in the middle of the next wave down. People are just
blithely telling the average person who’s been trying to save money
for retirement, who’s been trying to save money for his kid’s
college education, that they should be investing in the stock market,
“it’s as good as being in the bank, and actually better.” It’s
not. It is very, very dangerous, and I think commodities for most people
are very, very dangerous. You have to know what you’re doing to make
money in these things. So I’m advocating safety. That means don’t
keep your money in an unsafe bank. In Conquer
The Crash, I’ve got a list of the two safest banks in every state.
There’s no reason in the world to have your money in a bank rated C
for solvency potential. You should be in an A-rated bank. There are a
lot of things people can do to make their lives a lot better and make
sure they survive the depression that’s coming. The people that got
hurt in the Great Depression were not the people who got out at the top
and saved their money; they were the people who didn’t get out and let
everything go to nothing. And that’s what I’m trying to help people
prevent. They’re a little gun shy. They don’t like looking at their
401K statements, and they’re hiding them away, but they really need to
think what’s in there and realize the tremendous risk. Even though
this may sound radical, I think stocks are overpriced by a factor of 10.
They are way beyond where they ought to be priced, and you can tell that
just by looking at the dividends that they’re not paying.
JIM:
Well, it was amazing. We ran a database and we were trying to look at
stocks that had reasonable earnings, reasonable quality, a good paying
dividend higher than the S&P, higher than the Dow and a low PE ratio
and we ran this with an institution today. We found two!
BOB:
Listen Jim, you
just said the secret word. The secret word is reasonable. What we have in today’s prices for investments is
utterly unreasonable, and when you try to find something reasonably
priced you can’t do it, and that’s why I’m saying the best thing
that people can do, and I know this goes counter to your views, but I
think the very best thing people can do is to find a safe cash
equivalent, such as Swiss Money Market claims. Or recently, we’ve
switched to the dollar. We’re riding this move for all its worth, and
it’s not quite over yet; it’s about half way over. That is going to
maintain your sanity, your purchasing power of goods and services as we
head into this depression, but if you get caught into one of these fancy
investments people talk you into, you can lose it all. So that’s the
essence of my message.
JIM:
And Bob, do you think we will see -- one thing that happened that was
amazing with the events of 9/11, all of a sudden everybody woke up and
said at least the financial press wasn’t saying this was simply a bull
market correction, and all of a sudden the R-word, recession, got
mentioned and the bear market got mentioned, but it was a precipitating
event that all of a sudden suddenly changed psychology everywhere. Do
you think that’s coming?
BOB:
Absolutely. If
you can predict the stock market to some degree, you can predict the
changes in psychology. One of the things that’s coming up is not only
another wrenching movement towards more bearish psychology, but also the
third wave down is always when the worst news comes out. So we’re
expecting news to be worse than it was in 2001. That means worse than
the attack on the World Trade Center, for example, and worse than the
recession we had in 2001. We’re going to have a deeper economic
contraction and a lot more to worry about.
You
know, it’s funny: If you call a bull market, people tend to remember.
That was one of the things that helped my career back in 1978 when we
wrote a book saying there’s a great bull market coming. But one of the
ironies of being in this business is if you call a bear market, by the
time it’s over people don’t remember who said it because they are
too busy worrying about other things; the last thing on people’s minds
then is finance. One of the most famous periods of course was the
1929-32 collapse, and in the late 1920s everyone -- well not everyone,
but everyone involved in the stock market -- was talking about their
mutual funds; they called them investment trusts back then. And do you
know that by the time the 40s ended, I don’t think there was anybody
left talking about their investment trusts. Many of them had gone to
zero, and the ones that didn’t hadn’t recovered by substantial
amounts. I think we are in one of those periods, but it’s bigger.
People are enamored with finance; they’re enamored with the stock
market and investments in general; there’s more money changing hands
in this country over financial services than there is in manufacturing,
which is an outrageous symptom of the peak of a Grand Supercycle in
psychology and finance, and all of this is going to go away. It’s
going to melt away, just as it did after 1929.
JIM:
Well Bob, I want to compliment you. I wanted to have you back on the
program because you really are, as you say, you are an original giraffe.
You are always sticking your neck out, saying things that people don’t
quite see at the time, and I promise even though we have different views
on deflation -- I think hyperinflation comes first then deflation,
you’re of the view it’s deflation then hyperinflation -- I have
enough respect for your work, and believe me if you’re right I’ll be
the first to come on this program and say it.
BOB:
And let me
return the compliment, Jim, because you are one of the very few people
out there who has a well-thought out, strong opinion and yet is willing
to open the forum to have an interesting discussion. And when things
turn around and go your way instead of mine I’ll be happy to come on
your show and try and figure out why in the world I got it wrong.
JIM:
OK...Well, the name of the book is called Conquer
The Crash: You Can Survive And
Prosper In A Deflationary Depression. And Bob, as we close, why
don’t you give out your website. In fact we have a link on the front
page that people can get to, but give it out anyway.
BOB:
OK, and I’d
like to put out a little advertisement here. You can go to our website
and get a lot of information absolutely free. We put out daily reports.
We put out weekly reports. If you join something called Club EWI,
that’s for “Elliott Wave International,” our company, you can
participate in a lot of things we do, you can take a course to learn how
to apply the Elliott wave principle in your own investing, and that sort
of thing. And you can find all this wonderful stuff at www.elliottwave.com.
JIM:
All right. And accompanying this webcast, Bob is going to send some
charts and hopefully you can look at those charts of some of the topics
we covered in this interview and we’ll also have a direct link that if
you want to get to Bob’s site and find out all the wonderful things at
Elliott Wave.
Bob,
you’re a gentleman and a scholar, and I want to thank you so much for
your pioneering work.
Mr.
Prechter's Expert Page l Elliott
Wave International (EWI) l FSO
EWI Resource Page l Conquer
The Crash l Charts
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2005
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