After long and difficult negotiations, the SYRIZA-led government managed to reach an agreement with Greece’s creditors on a third bailout program.
However, one of the main implications in Greece’s fluid political field is that the main argument of the SYRIZA party and the whole anti-bailout camp was rejected – the same argument that won them the elections last January.
This argument was that Greece could remain in the euro with European financing but without implementing any kind of bailout program through austerity measures and structural reforms.
Now, it became apparent that staying in the Eurozone requires the acceptance of a fiscal consolidation program, the so-called Memorandum. Consequently, the only alternative that exists for those who reject the bailout program is the return to the national currency, the drachma.
Thus, the dividing line “pro-bailout vs. anti-bailout” that dominated the political scene in Greece since 2010, when the country first sought financial assistance by the EU and the IMF, now seems to have been replaced by the cleavage between those who advocate the status of Greece in the Eurozone and those who back the return to the drachma.
In other words, the new dividing line is “euro vs. drachma”.
Goalposts of the Greek Debate Have Moved
Given the fact that the great majority in Greece, according to the opinion polls, is in favor of the Eurozone membership, it is clear that the government’s decision to reach an agreement enjoys broad public support.
After all, it is no coincidence that both the first and the second package of measures, which were considered to be a prerequisite for the immediate financing of the country by the creditors, as well as the beginning of the negotiations for a third Memorandum, received broad parliamentary majority of more than 225 MPs in a parliament of 300 seats.
In particular, it was approved not only by the great majority of the parliamentarians of the coalition government SYRIZA-ANEL, but also by the MPs of the pro-European pro-bailout opposition parties, namely the center-right New Democracy, the centrist To Potami and the centre-left PASOK (Panhellenic Socialist Movement).
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Since both the first and second package of measures received broad parliamentary support, it is very likely that the third bailout, expected to be completed by the end of August, will be approved by the parliament as well.
The problem is that among those members of Parliament who voted against the first package of measures were, beyond the MPs of the anti-European anti-bailout parties of KKE (Communist Party of Greece) and the far-right Golden Dawn, more than 35 parliamentarians coming from the incumbent party of SYRIZA.
Specifically, fewer than 130 out 162 MPs of the coalition government voted in favour of the agreement with Greece’s creditors.
Despite the fact that these MPs were not expelled by the parliamentary group nor left the party on their own, this puts the survival of the two-party government in doubt. According to the Constitution a government needs at least 151 MPs to ensure the confidence of the 300-seat Parliament.
However, in the recent government reshuffle Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras did not seek to broaden his coalition government by cooperating with some of the opposition parties to increase his parliamentary base.
Instead, he preferred to expel those ministers who had voted against his government and appoint as ministers MPs that were loyal to him. In fact, Mr. Tsipras formed a minority government with the tolerance of the pro-European opposition parties.
Snap Elections More Likely This Year
Despite the fact that this is the first time that a minority government is formed since the restoration of the democratic regime in 1974, it is unlikely that the opposition will submit a vote of no confidence against the SYRIZA-led government.
This is a result of two factors: first, it seems unlikely that the negotiations and the parliamentary approval for the third bailout, which is necessary for Greece to avoid default and ‘Grexit’, will be completed on a short period of time. Second, SYRIZA is still leading in the polls.
However, it is clear that it will be too difficult for a minority government to implement the third program, including harsh austerity measures and painful structural changes. In addition, Tsipras seems to reckon that the implementation of the program will entail significant political cost for his government.
As a result, it is highly possible that in the aftermath of the completed negotiations for the third bailout and the parliamentary approval by the end of August, the prime minister will choose to call early elections to renew his electoral mandate.
Therefore, while the government surviving until the end of August seems likely, to secure both the signing and a broad parliamentary approval of the third Memorandum, it is less likely that it will avoid snap national elections by fall.
